Oracle staleness check present
USDD (Decentralized USD)'s assessment for RD-F-059 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Staleness check parameters not publicly documented. The OSM design implies holding last-known price if no valid update arrives (implicit stale-freeze). However, explicit on-chain staleness rejection parameters (updatedAt > now - X) in Spot or Median are not confirmed in public docs. ChainSecurity Jan-2025 audit required 'active monitoring' for oracle correctness — suggesting operational monitoring rather than on-chain automated staleness rejection is the primary defense.
Sources #
- AuditPUBLIC Code Assessment of USDD V2 Smart Contracts, January 24 2025ChainSecurity USDD V2 audit Jan 2025: 'active monitoring is required to ensure the oracle and governance work correctly' — implies reliance on operational monitoring rather than on-chain staleness checksretrieved 2026-05-17
- USDD OSM Contract DocsOSM docs: 'ensures that new price values propagated from the Oracles are not taken up by the system until a specified delay has passed' — no staleness threshold value documentedretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol rejects oracle reads older than a declared maximum age (i.e., checks `updatedAt > block.timestamp - maxStaleness`).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →