Timelock on sensitive actions
Usual (USD0 / bUSD0 / USUAL)'s assessment for RD-F-033 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No sensitive action (upgrade, mint, pause, oracle-set, floor-price-update, emergencyWithdraw) is timelocked. Role-gating via RegistryAccess is the sole control mechanism. The January 2025 floor price change demonstrated that economically-significant parameter changes can be activated immediately without delay — the FLOOR_PRICE_UPDATER_ROLE can act with no on-chain queue.
Sources #
- DocsbUSD0 tech docs — role definitions without timelockbUSD0 tech docs: FLOOR_PRICE_UPDATER_ROLE, FEE_SWEEPER_ROLE, PEG_MAINTAINER_ROLE, EARLY_BOND_UNLOCK_ROLE — none documented with timelockretrieved 2026-05-17
- Usual blog — Road to Parity (Jan 2025 floor price change)Usual blog 2025-01-23: floor price change introduced without prior DAO vote — demonstrates immediate execution capability of FLOOR_PRICE_UPDATER_ROLEretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →