Bridge rate-limiter / chain-pause as positive mitigant
Veda (BoringVault)'s assessment for RD-F-185 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
LayerZeroTellerWithRateLimiting (0x9AA79C84b79816ab920bBcE20f8f74557B514734) implements rate limiting on cross-chain share transfers. Share lock period (shareLockPeriod) prevents flash-loan-style deposit+bridge in one tx. Pauser.sol provides emergency pause on Manager. These are positive mitigants limiting extraction speed in an exploit scenario.
Sources #
- GitHubVeda Roles — Pauser.sol and rate-limiting infrastructureRoles directory: Pauser.sol present; TellerWithMultiAssetSupport: shareLockPeriod enforcedretrieved 2026-05-17
- LayerZeroTellerWithRateLimiting — rate limiting confirmed in contract nameLayerZeroTellerWithRateLimiting 0x9AA79C84: contract name confirms rate limiting implementationretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether the bridge implements a per-window outflow rate-limiter (and at what cap), and whether the protocol team can trigger a chain-level or validator-set emergency pause.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →