★ delegatecall/call in proposal execution without allowlist

Wormhole's assessment for RD-F-039 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

`delegatecall`/`call` in proposal execution, no allowlist | MultiGov `SpokeMessageExecutor` → `SpokeAirlock` forwards calldata to target addresses in proposal payloads. The architecture uses `.call()` (not `delegatecall`) according to standard OZ Governor pattern. No explicit target allowlist confirmed in public docs; MultiGov has been audited by Cyfrin (Oct 2024, Feb 2025), Sherlock (Mar 2025), Sec3/Zellic (Feb 2025) without publicly reported critical allowlist-bypass findings. Cannot fully ...

Sources #

Curator note
Extracted from 02-governance-admin.md — RD-F-039; no URL citedretrieved 2026-04-28

Methodology #

Determine whether the governance executor contract uses `delegatecall` or `call` with proposal-supplied target, without enforcing an allowlist of permitted targets.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol wormhole factor RD-F-039 score gray collected_at 2026-04-28 01:38:43