Formal verification coverage

Babylon Protocol's assessment for RD-F-009 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No formal verification (Certora, TLA+, Kani, Coq) has been applied to Babylon's custom modules (x/btcstaking, x/finality, EOTS) from publicly available sources. Informal Systems uses formal analysis techniques but their V2 audit was a security audit, not a machine-verified FV proof engagement. Novel cryptographic primitives (EOTS, covenant committee Schnorr multisig) would benefit most from FV. No Certora/Kani proofs publicly available.

Sources #

Curator note
No FV engagement foundWeb search returned no Certora/Kani/TLA+ proofs for Babylon; not found in audit page or GitHub orgretrieved 2026-05-04

Methodology #

Determine the percentage of protocol-declared critical invariants covered by a formal verification proof (Certora Prover, Kani, Halmos, or equivalent).

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol babylon-protocol factor RD-F-009 score gray collected_at 2026-05-04 19:43:27