Emergency-veto multisig present
StakeWise v3's assessment for RD-F-040 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Partial veto mechanism: SafeSnap allows the 4-of-7 DAO Safe to reject/cancel a SafeSnap-queued transaction before execution if a malicious contract is flagged (documented in governance process and profile §6). However, this veto is held by the same Safe that executes proposals — not a separate independent guardian. Cancel role and execute role share the same 4-of-7 set.
Sources #
- InternalStakeWise profile §6 — SafeSnap veto reference00-profile.md §6: SafeSnap veto — DAO multisig committee has documented override capacity to reject transactions if malicious contract proposedretrieved 2026-05-16
- StakeWise DAO Governance Process — forum.stakewise.ioforum.stakewise.io/t/stakewise-dao-governance-process/49 — governance process describes multisig committee override capabilityretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether an emergency-veto or guardian multisig exists with power to cancel malicious proposals before execution.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol stakewise factor RD-F-040 score yellow collected_at 2026-05-16 01:03:28